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ABSTRACT
Thurgood Marshall famously stated:  “I was appointed to a life term, and I
intend to serve it.”1  Justice Marshall’s sentiment is in lockstep with the expressed
intent of the Founding Fathers, who embedded the concept of life tenure for Article
III judges into the Constitution at the time of its adoption.  This paper explores the
extent to which Article III judges in this era echo the sentiment expressed by
Justice Marshall, and the reasons some Article III judges have elected not to serve
a life term.  The paper also examines whether Article III judges have gravitated
toward careers in the legal academy, a prospect that has been the topic of
considerable public discussion within the last ten years, and whether their
decisions to leave are driven by economic concerns.
This thesis reports the results of interviews of forty-eight Article III judges
divided into three clusters.  Cluster One (“Baby Judges”) is composed of judges
1David Atkinson, Leaving the Bench:  Supreme Court Justices at the End
(Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 1999), at 158.
2
who have been Article III judges for fewer than five years.  Cluster Two
(“Sustainers”) is composed of judges who are within five years of qualifying for
Senior Status or having qualified for Senior Status.2  Cluster Three (“The
Departed”) is composed of judges who have relinquished their Article III status
and departed the ranks of the judiciary.  Through the reported experiences and
opinions of these Article III judges, this paper seeks to explore the evolution of life
tenure for Article III judges and to explore the relationship among departing
Article III judges, the legal academy, and judicial compensation.
2I borrow the term “Sustainers” from my days in Junior League.  Sustainers
were those members who were too old to be considered “junior” but too young to
be put completely out to pasture.
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I. Introduction
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. 
The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall
hold their offices during good behavior . . .
It is universally agreed that the text providing that judges appointed under
this article “shall hold their offices during good behavior,” bestows lifetime tenure
upon Article III judges.3
The Founding Fathers considered life tenure to be a vital component of the
national judiciary.  In their Federalist Papers, both James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton extolled the virtues of life tenure for federal judges.  Hamilton described
life tenure as “an excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the
[legislative] body.”4  Hamilton also considered life tenure to be “the best expedient
which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
3Mary L. Clark, Judicial Retirement and Return to Practice, 60 Cath. L.
Rev. 841, 859 (2011) (“Article III judges have enjoyed life tenure without
mandatory retirement since the time of the Constitution’s adoption.”).
4Id. at 860 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 at 465 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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administration of the laws.5  It was widely believed during the formative years of
our system of government that life tenure for national judges was vital to the
independence of the judiciary, the integrity of the judiciary, and the impartiality of
the judiciary.  Conventional wisdom was that these essential attributes of a national
judiciary could not be attained if the judicial appointments were temporary.  Even
then, the sentiment existed that anything short of life tenure “would undermine the
government’s ability to appoint the most qualified judges, given the sacrifice
involved in leaving profitable law practices for the bench.”6
Few would dispute that appointment to the federal bench is the pinnacle of
the legal profession.7  Particularly impressive is the denominated “psychic income”
that accompanies appointment as an Article III judge, including instant credibility,
respect and gravitas.8  Thus far, it would appear that appointment as an Article III
5Id.; Jackson, supra note 2, at 971.
6Id.
7Albert Yoon, Love’s Labor’s Lost?  Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court
Judges:  1945-2000, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1029, 1031-31 (July, 2003); Federal Judicial
Pay Erosion:  A Report on the Need For Reform, ABA/FBA (Feb. 2001) at 12
(recognizing that describing service as an Article III Judge “has long been regarded
as the pinnacle of success and prestige in the profession”).
8Kristen A. Holt, Justice for Judges:  The Roadblocks on the Path to Judicial
Compensation Reform, 55 Cath. U.L. Rev. 513, 519 (Winter, 2006); Federal
Judicial Pay Erosion at 12 (giving examples of “psychic income” as the
(continued...)
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judge with the accompanying lifetime tenure, prestige and other “psychic income”
would be a dream come true. And for many Article III judges, it is a dream come
true.9  Nevertheless, in recent years Article III judges have increasingly elected to
relinquish their Article III commissions, along with their lifetime tenure as federal
judges.10  It was widely believed that law salaries prompted the exodus of Article
III judges.11  There was also considerable speculation that judges were increasingly
leaving the bench to enter the legal academy.12
Not everyone agrees that the compensation of federal judges is causing an
8(...continued)
opportunity to engage in interesting, exciting and challenging work”, “the
satisfaction of serving the public,” and “rendering public service in a highly visible
and respected role”).
9Yoon, supra note 7. 
10Ronald D. Rotunda, A Few Modest Proposals to Reform the Law
Governing Federal Judicial Salaries, 12 No. 4 Prof. Law 1, 3-4 (Fall, 2000).  
11Id., p. 4.
12This speculation may have been triggered by the appointment of several
high-profile former federal judges to law school deanships.  See, e.g., Robert
Wilonsky, U.S. District Judge Furgeson Is Named Dean of UNT’s Downtown
Dallas Law School, Dallas Observer, Jan. 11, 2012; Peter Lattman, Duke Law
School Selects Judge David Levi as Dean, Wall Street Journal Law Blog, Jan. 3,
2007.
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exodus.13  For example, Yeon has suggested that judges benefit from increasing
non-monetary perks.  However, even Yoon acknowledges the sentiments expressed
by various Supreme Court justices criticizing the relatively low pay of the federal
judiciary.14  
This paper explores, among other things, whether the pay structure is a
motivating factor for those judges who have made the difficult decision to give up
their life-tenured federal judgeships.  Employing a modified longitudinal approach,
I examined the views of life tenure held by Baby Judges, Sustainers and The
Departed to determine whether compensation was a motivating factor in their
career decisions.  I also explored the extent to which the legal academy is the
preferred career choice for judges leaving the bench.
As previously noted, the Baby Judges cluster (Cluster One) is composed of
judges who have been Article III judges for fewer than five years.  I selected five
years because that is the time frame that is loosely agreed upon as the learning
curve for Article III judges.
The Sustainers cluster (Cluster Two) is composed of judges who are within
13Yoon, supra note 7, at 1055-56.
14Id. at 1035-36; Lynne Marek, Pay Hikes for U.S. Judges Challenged, Nat’l
Law Journal, Jan. 7, 2008.
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five years of qualifying for Senior Status or having qualified for Senior Status.  I
selected this time frame because that is the time frame selected by the 
Administrative Office of the Courts (based on my personal experience) to target
judges for training on career plans post-senior status.
The Departed Cluster (Cluster Three) is self-explanatory.  I selected sixteen
judges from a list provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts, or judges
whose pending retirements were publicly disseminated.
Interviews of forty-eight Article III judges from throughout the country
reveal a complicated interrelationship between Article III judges and their
compensation.  Even those judges who ultimately relinquished their lifetime
tenures due to financial considerations described doing so mostly with extreme
reluctance, considerable anguish and lingering regret.
The interviews did not reveal that Article III judges are clamoring to enter
the ranks of the legal academy.  Although some judges expressed interest in the
academy (mainly as professors rather than deans), the most popular successive
career for former judges as reflected in the interviews was private arbitration/
mediation (five of sixteen).  In a trend seemingly unique to California, four federal
judges left to become appellate judges for the state court.  
Overall, the interviews were enlightening, revealing and intriguing.  In sum,
9
based on responses received, this paper reflects financial considerations as an
important factor, but not the only factor contributing to federal judges’
relinquishment of Article III status.  The responses also revealed that the judges
who elected to enter the academy were mainly responding to a unique opportunity
rather than to a general desire to join the academy under any circumstances.
II. History Of The Pay Structure For Article III Judges
A brief examination of the pay structure for Article III judges will be useful
in placing the contents of this paper into context.  As an initial matter, it is
important to note that, in addition to conferring lifetime tenure upon federal judges,
Article III of the Constitution provides that judges of the “supreme and inferior
[federal] courts . . . shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” 
Implementation of this text has proven to be complicated and contentious.
The genesis of the current pay schedule for Article III judges is the Postal
Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967.  That statutory scheme included the
creation of a Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries.15  The
Commission is now composed of eleven members from the private sector,
152 U.S.C. § 351 (1967).  The commission is now known as the Citizens’
Commission on Public Service and Compensation.  Id. (2015).
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allocated in the following manner:
• 2 members appointed by the President;
• 1 member appointed by the President pro tem of the Senate, as
recommended by the majority and minority Senate leaders;
• 1 member appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
• 2 members appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and
• 5 members appointed by the Administrator of General Services.16
In United States v. Will, 101 S. Ct. 471, 475 (1980), the United States
Supreme Court explained that the Federal Salary Act provided for the quadrennial
review of executive, legislative and judicial salaries.  This review was designed to
examine and compare the salaries of executives, legislators and judges to the
General Schedule (GS) salary schedule applicable to most other federal
employees.17  The Commission was to meet every four years to prepare salary
recommendations for submission to the President.  The President forwarded his
succeeding recommendation to Congress.  Absent express Congressional objection,
the President’s recommendation was to take effect.18
162 U.S.C. § 352.
17Id.
18Holt, supra note 8 at 523 n.51.
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To augment the Federal Pay Act, in 1975 Congress passed the Executive
Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act to adjust for inflation.19  However, in those
years when Congress rejected its own cost-of-living adjustments, the adjustments
for top executives and federal judges were also rejected.20
In 1978, thirteen federal district court judges filed an action against the
United States, contending that the rejection of cost-of-living adjustments violated
the Compensation Clause of Article III, which prohibits the diminishment of the
salaries of Article III judges.21  Of the four years at issue, the Supreme Court
determined that the Compensation Clause was violated in two of the four years.22 
The Court predicated its ruling on a determination of when the cost-of-living
increases vested.  If the increases vested, i.e., were implemented, before the
legislation rejecting the increase was passed and signed by the President, the
Compensation Clause was violated.23  On the other hand, if the increase was not
implemented before the legislation was passed and signed by the President, the
19Id. at 523; P.L. 94-82 (August 9, 1975).
20Id., Will 101 S. Ct. at 475-77.
21Will, 101 S. Ct. at 483-84; U.S. Const., Art. III. 
22Will, 101 S. Ct. at 486-88.
23Id. at 485-88.
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Compensation Clause was not violated.24  This unstable state of affairs continued
until 1989, when a sea change in judicial compensation occurred, enactment of the
Ethics Reform Act.25
The Ethics Reform Act included a provision granting a 25 percent pay raise
to Article III judges.26  However, in return Article III judges were prohibited from
receiving any honoraria for participating in law-related activities such as seminars
and law school moot court competitions.27  Finally, the Act limited compensation
for teaching by active judges to roughly $20,000 annually.28  To many observers,
Article III judges lost significant earning power as a result of passage of the Ethics
Reform Act.  As noted by one writer, for example, in the last year before the Ethics
Reform Act took effect, one Supreme Court justice earned $37,000.00 in honoraria
alone.29
24Id.
25Holt, supra note 8 at 525 (“The Ethics Act significantly altered the
boundaries of judicial compensation.”).
26See, Ethics Reform Act of 1989, PL 101-194, § 703(a)(3) (Nov. 30, 1989).
27Id. at § 501(b).
28Id. at §§ 502, 804; Rotunda, supra n.10 at 5.
29Rotunda, supra n.10 at 6 n.38; Beers v. United States, 696 F.3d 1174, 1182
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (reporting that a significant number of federal judges earned
(continued...)
13
To make matters worse, the cost-of-living adjustments included in the Ethics
Reform Act were not applied to judicial salaries as expected.  The most vexing
reason for this development, in the eyes of many judges, was the linkage between
Congressional salaries and judicial pay.  In the words of one reporter:  “The
linkage of district judges’ and Congressional salaries means that judges pay the
price when members of Congress discern that it would be politically unpopular to
raise their own pay.30
Frustrated by this state of affairs, a group of federal judges filed an action in
Washington, D.C. asserting that the denial of the cost-of-living increases provided
for in the Ethics Reform Act violated the Compensation Clause.31  In its ruling, the
district court distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Will, finding that the
cost-of-living adjustments in the Ethics Reform Act vested immediately and
occurred automatically, without further action by Congress or the President.32 
Because judges did not receive cost-of-living adjustments in certain years that
29(...continued)
outside income ranging between $16,000-$39,000).
30Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Advocates Higher Pay for Judiciary, New
York Times, Jan. 1, 2007.
31Williams v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 52, 65 (D.D.C. 1999).
32Id. at 64.
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there were adjustments for GS employees, the district court found a violation of the
Compensation Clause.33
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling in favor of
the judges, rejecting the district court’s reasoning that the cost-of-living
adjustments in the Ethics Reform Act vested immediately and automatically.34  
Rather than distinguishing the Supreme Court’s decision in Will as the district
court did, the Federal Circuit reverted to the reasoning in Will, concluding that
each cost-of-living adjustment vested on the first day of the applicable fiscal year.35 
Therefore, if Congress passed legislation blocking the cost-of-living increase
before the first day of the applicable fiscal year,36 the increase had failed to vest.
Most recently, yet a third group of federal judges sought relief in federal
court for denial of cost-of-living increases.  In Beer v. United States, federal judges
once again argued that withholding of the salary adjustments in the Ethics Reform
Act violated the Compensation Clause.37  Surprisingly, the Federal Circuit reversed
33Id. at 65.
34Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1023, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
35Id. at 1031.
36Id.
37696 F.3d 1174, 1178-79 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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its decision in Williams, agreeing with the federal judges that they were entitled to
the cost-of-living adjustments in the Ethics Reform Act.38  The Federal Circuit
concluded that the Compensation Clause “protects not only judicial compensation
that has already taken effect but also reasonable expectations of maintenance of
that compensation level.”39  Although the Compensation Clause does not itself
require cost-of-living adjustments, the coupling of promised cost-of-living
adjustments and limitations on outside income “triggered the expectation-related
protections of the Compensation Clause for all sitting judges.40  When the Supreme
Court declined to review the Federal Circuit’s ruling, the decision of the Federal
Circuit became final, awarding the long-awaited cost-of-living adjustments to the
federal judiciary.41
But was the Beer victory too little, too late?  As early as 1986, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was expressing dissatisfaction with the pay for Article III judges.42  In
38Id. at 1184-85.
39Id. at 1184.
40Id. at 1184-85.
41United States v. Beer, 133 S. Ct. 1997 (2013).
42Yoon, supra n.7 at 1035.
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fact, he raised the issue in each of his Year-End Reports from 1997 on.43  Chief
Justice Rehnquist expressed the view that inadequate compensation compelled
federal judges to leave judicial service for more lucrative opportunities.44  He urged
Congress to increase salaries for federal judges to maintain the quality of the
federal bench.45
Chief Justice Roberts continued Chief Justice Rehnquist’s practice of urging
Congress to increase compensation for federal judges.  In his first year-end report,
Chief Justice Roberts made his point emphatically:  “If Congress gave judges a
raise of 30 percent tomorrow, judges would—after adjusting for inflation—be
making what judges made in 1969.”46
Chief Justice Roberts elected to raise his concerns regarding lagging judicial
pay as the sole topic of his second year-end report.47  Chief Justice Roberts noted
that his predecessor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, “had spoken out on the issue of
43Id. at 1035.
44Id.
45Id.
46Holt, supra n.8 at 513.
47Greenhouse, supra n.30.
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judicial pay for 20 years.”48
Chief Justice Roberts described the failure of Congress to enact judicial pay
raises as a “constitutional crisis that puts the future of the federal courts in
jeopardy,” and “threatens to undermine the strength and independence of the
federal judiciary.”49
Referencing the “dramatic erosion of judicial compensation,” Chief Justice
Roberts declared that “it was clear that the time is ripe for our nation’s judges to
receive a substantial salary increase.”50
Justice Breyer added his voice to the chorus of those calling for a pay raise
for federal judges in his testimony before the National Commission on Public
Service.51
Justice Breyer began his remarks by informing the Commission “that
something has gone seriously wrong with the judicial compensation system that the
48Id.
49Id.
50Id.
51Statement of Justice Stephen G. Breyer Before the National Commission
on the Public Service, July 15, 2002, available at http://www.Supreme
Court.gov/public info/speeches/ncps_project.pdf (last visited February 29, 2016).
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Constitution’s Framers foresaw.52  Justice Breyer pointed out that the framers of
the Constitution understood that judicial independence and adequate compensation
go hand-in-hand.53  To emphasize his point regarding the erosion of judicial
salaries, Justice Breyer, a former law professor,54 compared past and present
salaries of federal judges and professionals in the legal academy.55  Justice Breyer
first compared the salaries of a district court judge, professor and law school dean
in 1969.  At that time, the respective salaries were $40,000 for a district court
judge, $28,000 for “top professors” and $33,000 for a law school dean.56
Thirty years later, the salary differential was completely reversed.  While the
salary for a district court judge had risen to $150,000, the salary for senior law
professors was approximately $250,000, and the salary for law school deans was
approximately $325,000.57  Justice Breyer described this salary gap between
52Id. at 1.
53Id. at 2.
54Greenhouse, supra n.30.
55Statement of Justice Stephen G. Bryer at 4.
56Id.
57Id. and Appendix, Chart Five.
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federal judges and professionals in the academy as a “chasm.”58
It was perhaps this comparison by Justice Breyer that prompted the chatter
about federal judges relinquishing their Article III status to enter the ranks of the
legal academy.  However, federal judges were assuming the role of law school
dean long before Justice Breyer’s statement.  
III. Federal Judges Transitioning to the Academy
While there are a number of Article III judges who have made the transition
from the judiciary to the academy, to set the context it might be helpful to discuss a
few of the earliest/most prominent examples.
One of the earliest instances of a federal judge assuming the deanship of a
law school involved Judge J.C. Hutcheson, a district court judge for the southern
district of Texas.59  Judge Hutcheson graduated as valedictorian of his law school
class at the University of Texas in 1900.60  He was described as a “martinet and an
old-time southern hot-head.”61  He engaged in the practice of law “with a forthright
58Id. at 4.
59Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Jan. 6, 2016).
60Roger K. Newman, The Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law
(New Haven and London, Yale University Press 2009, at 280-81.
61Id. at 280.
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and unconventional outlook shaped by a quick, combative and confident
personality.”62  In 1917, Hutcheson threw his hat into the ring for a federal
judgeship.63  He was successful in his quest, being nominated by Judge Woodrow
Wilson on March 29, 1918 and confirmed eight days later (oh for the good old
days!).64  Judge Hutcheson presided over the busiest federal judicial district with a
single judge.65  However, the most remarkable part of Judge Hutcheson’s history is
that he served as the first dean of South Texas Law School while sitting as an
active judge.66  It does not appear that any law or regulation prohibited Judge
Hutcheson’s simultaneous service as a federal judge and law school dean.67
62Id.
63Id. at 281.
64Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra n.59.
65Newman, supra note 60 at 281.
66Id. 
67An analogous circumstance, involving a different district court judge,
confirms the lack of any official restraint on the outside employment of then-sitting
federal judges.  In 1920, Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis was appointed the first
commissioner of major league baseball.  Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline
and the Appearance of Impropriety:  What the Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets,
94 Minn. L. Rev. 1914, 1921-22 (June, 2010).  Much like Judge Hutcheson, Judge
Landis was described as a “hard-hitting, no-nonsense, call-them-as-you-see-them”
judge.  Id. at 1921.  Apparently, it was thought that an individual of Judge Landis’
temperament could successfully “combat gambling and bribery influences that
(continued...)
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Judge Hutcheson served in the dual capacities of federal district court
judge/law school dean from 1923-1931.68  The end of Judge Hutcheson’s deanship
coincided with his ascension to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to fill a newly
created seat.69
In the same era, the first African-American federal judge, William H. Hastie,
resigned his judgeship to become dean of Howard Law School.70  Judge Hastie was
67(...continued)
many thought were corrupting the national pastime.  Id. at 1922.  Judge Landis
demonstrated his commitment to purging baseball of corruption by instituting a
lifetime ban of the eight members of the Chicago White Sox baseball team who
were accused of rigging the 1919 World Series.  Id.  Judge Landis was undeterred
by the fact that the eight had been acquitted of all criminal charges.  Id.
Although the general public lauded Judge Landis for his dedication to
restoring the integrity of America’s sport, the nation’s attorneys were not as
sanguine.  Judge Landis was roundly criticized “for tarnishing the image of the
judiciary by retaining his federal judgeship while serving as Commissioner.”  Id. at
1923.  However, his critics could point to no law, rule or regulation that prohibited
Judge Landis from simultaneously serving as a federal judge and baseball
commissioner.  Id.  As the United States Attorney General explained:  “There
seems to be nothing as a matter of general law which would prohibit a district
judge from receiving additional compensation for other than strictly judicial
service, such as acting as arbitrator or commissioner.”  Id.
68Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra, n. 59; Rosenblatt’s
Dean’s Database, available at http://www.law.mc.edu/deans/school
profile.php?univ=South + Texas + College + of + Law (last visited Jan. 6, 2016).
69Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra n. 59.
70Yale Biographical Dictionary of Federal Judges, supra n. 60 at 256-57.
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appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1937 to the federal district court in
the Virgin Islands.71  However, the judgeship in the Virgin Islands was not
established under Article III.72  As Judge Hastie explained in his oral history, when
he was appointed to the district court judgeship in the Virgin Islands, the tenure
was a four-year term.73  Judge Hastie “never thought in terms of making a career in
the Virgin Islands.”74  Rather, he was more interested in pursuing a career “on the
mainland.”75  Nevertheless, he would have served out his four-year term had he not
been offered the deanship of Howard University Law School in 1939.76  Judge
Hastie commented that he had always had an interest in teaching, and had
previously taught at Howard University Law School.77  So, perhaps inevitably, he
71Id.
72Id.
73Jerry N. Hess, Oral History Interview With Judge William H. Hastie,
Jan. 5, 1972 at 2, available at http://www.truman library.org/oralhist/hastie.htm
(last visited Jan. 6, 2016).
74Id. at 3.
75Id.
76Id.
77Id.
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returned to Howard University Law School as its dean from 1939-46.78
The most remarkable consequence of Judge Hastie’s assumption of the
deanship at Howard University Law School was his pivotal role in assembling and
training a cadre of attorneys to systematically dismantle the invidious system of
segregation in this country.79  Included among that cadre of attorneys was future
Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall.80  The culmination of the efforts of
these dedicated civil rights attorneys was the momentous decision in Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).81  It is safe to say that this federal judge turned dean
impacted society and the legal system in an unforgettable way.
Of more recent vintage, Judge David Levi, an Article III judge in the Eastern
District of California, resigned his Article III commission to become the dean of
Duke University Law School in 2007.82  Some three years after making the
transition from federal judge to law school dean, Dean Levi penned an essay
78Id.
79Spottswood W. Robinson, III, In Memoriam:  William H. Hastie, U. Pa. L.
Rev. 8-12 (Nov. 1976).
80Id. at 9.
81Id. at 11.
82Wall Street Journal Law Blog, supra n. 12.
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reflecting upon his transition.83
Two points made by Dean Levi in his essay are particularly pertinent.  The
first was that a career shift from judgeship to deanship “may have seemed
surprising.”84  As Dean Levi noted, many in the legal community would be
surprised that a federal judge would relinquish the “prestige, importance and
security” associated with an Article III judicial appointment.85  This comment
harkens back to the “psychic income” that accompanies an Article III judgeship.86 
As Dean Levi remarked, “[a]pparently ‘Judge’ trumps ‘Dean’ even within the law
school.”87  
The second pertinent point was Dean Levi’s observation that the “low pay
suffered by federal judges” renders them susceptible to favorable financial terms
83David F. Levi, From Judge to Dean:  Reflections on the Bench and the
Academy, La. Law Rev., Vol. 70, No. 3, Spring 2010.
84Id. at 913.
85Id.
86Holt, supra n.8; see also William Alsup, Training the Next Generation: 
Do it!  Get Out There-Be An Advocate, Assn’n. of Bus. Trial Lawyers Rept.,
Northern Calif., Vol. 24 No. 2 (Fall 2015) (“Since the 1940s, opinion polls in the
United States have consistently shown that our federal courts rank very high on the
public confidence scale . . .”).
87Levi, supra n.83 at 913.
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dangled by state or international courts.88  Dean Levi’s observation dovetails with
the national conversation addressing judicial pay, and is consistent with a
phenomenon in California where federal district court judges are relinquishing
their Article III commissions to assume judgeships on the state appellate court, as
reflected in several of the reported interviews.
The stories of these interesting judges reinforce the premise that it is not a
new phenomenon that Article III judges are relinquishing life tenure.  The
challenge is to ascertain what is prompting these relinquishments and determine
whether there is cause for concern.
IV. Motivation
In addition to judges who relinquish life tenure before becoming eligible for
full retirement, Article III judges approaching the age of sixty-five, the age when
most judges are eligible for senior status, must decide whether to continue in active
status, take senior status89 or leave Article III service altogether (full retirement).
88Id. at 915.
89Generally, senior status is a semi-retirement from the federal bench with a
reduced caseload and “continued office space and secretarial and law clerk
support.”  Honorable Frederic Bloc, Senior Status:  An “Active” Senior Judge
Corrects Some Common Misunderstandings, 92 Cornell L. Rev., 533, 539-40
(2007).  “It is at once apparent that the federal judicial system would be
enormously burdened if the senior judges were to retire rather than continue to
(continued...)
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This decision is a very serious matter to the Administrative Office of the
[Federal] Courts, as evidenced by the annual planning seminar offered to
Article III judges approaching eligibility for senior status.  As the national
conversation has continued to swirl around the lack of pay raises for Article III
judges, the exodus of Article III judges, and the lure of the academy, I became
more and more curious about why an Article III judge would elect to relinquish
lifetime tenure, whether financial considerations were driving factors, and whether
the academy was the natural destination.  Through my interviews, I aimed to get an
inkling of some of the factors that explain the behavior of Article III judges
contemplating continued lifetime tenure.
More broadly, I thought it important to gather information about what
factors prompt judges to consider leaving the bench, whether they have a particular
interest in academia, and the extent to which money or some other factor(s) are
influencing their decisions. 
Most court watchers agree that an Article III judgeship comes with a prestige
89(...continued)
serve, even though there is little economic incentive to do.”  Id.; see also Milton J.
Valencia, “Senior Status” Lets Federal Judges Keep Working For Free, Boston
Globe, Dec. 12, 2014.
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and mystique that “is hard to match elsewhere.”90  As one professor described it: 
“[Article III judges are] held in high regard by the bench and the bar.  It’s the
closest thing to god you can be in legal circles.  The power is immense.91  (How’s
that for psychic income?).
This paper explores why this immense psychic income may not be enough
for some Article III judges.
V. Methodology
I began my inquiry by asking all of the judges what their mindset was
regarding life tenure upon being appointed as an Article III judge, i.e., whether it
was their intent to remain an Article Three judge for the balance of their
professional career.  Then, for the Baby Judges and Sustainers, I inquired generally
what future considerations might cause them to re-think their commitment to
lifetime tenure, including on-the-job frustrations.  I subsequently inquired about
the extent to which financial considerations might impact their decision to
relinquish life tenure, including the amount of money, if any, that would tempt
them to leave.
90Pete Brush, NY’s Rookie Federal Judges Could Face Job-Hopping
Pressure, Law 360, available at http://www.law 360.com/articles/396505/ny-s-
rookie-federal-judges-could-face-job-hoppi . . . (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
91Id. 
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In exploring their interest in the academy, I expressly inquired whether the
judges would be interested in the academy as a professor and as a dean.  As a
follow-up question to the Sustainers because at least two of their number had
actively sought to leave the ranks of the judiciary, I inquired about what career
opportunities could entice them into leaving the judiciary.
The questions for The Departed focused on the reason/s for the decision to
relinquish Article III status and how important financial considerations were to that
decision.  I asked The Departed whether they had any regrets about the decision,
whether they would make the same decision again, and whether they miss being a
federal judge.  I also inquired about whether they miss the prestige associated with
being a federal judge.
I elected to use a qualitative method of investigation because this method is
particularly suited to a situation where a level of trust and rapport has already been
established, and particular information is being sought.  Interviewing my
colleagues intersected neatly with the need for open-ended questions, and follow-
up discussion depending on the various responses received. 
I selected the forty-eight judges I interviewed largely from a pool of judges
with whom I had attended seminars or served with as a committee member or court
colleague.  Approximately five of the interviewees were referred by mutual
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acquaintances.
Once I compiled a list of approximately seventy-five names, I either emailed
or telephoned the individual judges to explain my interest in interviewing them for
my thesis.  I interviewed the first forty-eight judges who responded.
Of the forty-eight judges, thirty-five were district court judges and thirteen
were appellate judges.  I did not use random sampling or try to equalize district
court judges and appellate judges because I was not attempting to perform a
statistical study.  I was more interested in gathering some fundamental impressions
regarding Article III judges generally.  I recognize that this methodology is not
fully representative.  Nevertheless, I believe that I was able to garner some useful
information.
With the exception of one face-to-face interview, I interviewed each judge
over the telephone.  The interviews were semi-structured in that I had a pre-
determined list of questions that I wanted to address.  However, I asked the
questions in an open-ended way and followed up with additional questions
depending on the individual responses.  I assured each of the interviewees that the
interviews would be completely anonymous, and that identifying information
would be kept to a minimum in the study.  This assurance was very important to
the interviewees.  One interviewee even called after the interview to reaffirm that
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no one would be able to determine her/his identity because s/he had divulged
matters that were not known to his colleagues. With the exception of noting that
several district court judges in California have gone to the California appellate
court, I adhered strictly to my assurance to provide no identifying information.  I
made an exception for the California phenomenon because it was a unique
circumstance, and the California judges had no objection.
I also recognize that one limitation of using interviews is that the interviewer
is only able to gather the information the responder is willing to provide, and that
information may not be fully accurate.  Nevertheless, I felt confident that due to
our shared experiences, I had an excellent connection with the judges I
interviewed, and that I was able to elicit accurate information.  With these
acknowledged limitations, I proceed.
I readily confess that I am far from being a trained interviewer.  I also
acknowledge that the number of individuals I interviewed (48) is relatively small. 
Nevertheless, I am convinced that my interviews with the judges who graciously
agreed to speak with me will shed some light on the behavior of Article III judges
making decisions regarding their personal career choices.  
I elected to interview Article III judges from all over the United States rather
than from any one Circuit.  Again, I assured each individual that the information
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gathered would not be reported in such a way that any individual judge could be
identified.  That assurance was extremely important to many of the judges,
especially those who are on the brink of going from a Sustainer to one of The
Departed.
I arrived at the “cluster” idea by happenstance.  The very first judge I
interviewed (one of The Departed) informed me that when s/he92 was first sworn in
as an Article III judge, s/he saw himself as an Article III judge for life.    S/he put it
this way:  “If anyone had asked me when I was first appointed as an Article III
judge, I would’ve said that I would die on the bench.”93
That comment piqued my curiosity regarding whether all, or virtually all,
Article III judges shared that sentiment upon appointment to the bench, and if so,
how The Departed go from that sentiment to relinquishing their Article III status.  I
also developed some curiosity regarding the evolution of the decision-making
process.  At what point in their careers do Article III judges typically begin to
consider becoming one of the Departed?  I became convinced that the Sustainers
were the most likely group to provide valuable insight on that question.  Finally, it
was my hope that the Departed would candidly discuss why they left.
92I use this format so as not to reveal the gender of the interviewee.
93Telephone Interview with Departed Judge A, November 16, 2015.
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When defining categories in any endeavor, line drawing is unavoidable.  I
have no doubt that someone doing a similar project could draw the lines elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, the clusters I selected appeared most logical to me because they
represent the natural career progression for Article III judges.  In addition, Baby
Judges are only exposed to the full complexity of judicial responsibilities once they
have served for a period of time.  It appeared rational to me that the contrast, if
any, between the responses of fairly new Article III judges and their more senior
counterparts would provide useful and interesting information regarding the
relative benefits and burden of life tenure over time.
Finally, in view of the extensive and continued debate regarding the pay of
Article III judges, I concluded that interviewing judges who have actually resigned
their Article III commissions might inform us whether there is a common
denominator among those judges that suggests a festering retention problem that
should be addressed.
I must say that I enjoyed discussing these questions with my colleagues and
their responses gave me considerable food for thought as I approach the age of
eligibility for senior status.  I was also gratified by the number of my subjects who
considered this a fascinating topic and asked for a copy of the thesis upon
completion.  With that said, I present the results of my interviews.
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VI. Cluster One - Baby Judges
A. Initial Commitment to Life Tenure
With this group of judges, who have been Article III judges for fewer than
five years, I wanted to explore how deeply they were committed to the lifetime
tenure that comes with being an Article III judge.  As described by The Departed
judge referenced above, the Baby Judges expressed an almost unanimous intent to
remain Article III judges for the balance of their professional careers.  The one
thing that stood out in the responses from the Baby Judges when asked about their
commitment to life tenure was how much they loved being federal judges.   One
Baby Judge described her/his position as a “great job” that s/he was “thrilled” to
have.94  Another described the work as “challenging” and fulfilling.95  A third Baby
Judge put it this way:
It’s very comfortable to realize one can stay in a job and
become as good as you can be without being afraid of
losing your job if someone disagrees with you.96
A Baby Judge who had previously been a state court judge stated that s/he
94Telephone Interview with Baby Judge A, February 12, 2016.
95Telephone Interview with Baby Judge B, January 20, 2016.
96Telephone Interview with Baby Judge C, November 17, 2016.
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“love[d] being a federal judge compared to being a state court judge.”97  S/he
explained that the “work coming in the door is unlike anything else you can do
anywhere else.  Everyday there are ten new questions and one-third of the
questions I never thought of before.”98  S/he described the Article III judgeship as
“the essence of being a judge.  The elective concerns disappear and more resources
are available [such as elbow law clerks].”99
Another Baby Judge was similarly effusive, expressing “love” for the “best
job s/he ever had.”100  She described the job as an “intellectually satisfying
position.”101
In the same vein, a different Baby Judge professed “absolute love” for the
job, with “every day [being] new and fresh.”102
One Baby Judge reported that s/he was asked this exact question by the
Senate Judiciary Committee because s/he was so young when s/he was appointed
97Telephone Interview with Baby Judge D, November 28, 2015.
98Id.
99Id.
100Telephone Interview with Baby Judge E, December 29, 2015.
101Id.
102Telephone Interview with Baby Judge F, December 29, 2015.
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to the bench that s/he would have to serve more than twenty years before s/he
could take senior status.  S/he responded to the Judiciary Committee that all the
federal judges s/he had observed appeared to love what they do, and s/he had no
doubt that s/he would complete her tenure.  Upon taking the bench, her/his
expectations were confirmed.  S/he “loves the intellectual process of what Article
III judges do.”103  S/he expounded that there is “so much to learn and so much
work” that s/he had not “thought beyond doing this job she loves.”104  
The attraction of Article III status for one Baby Judge was “the ability to do
what’s right as opposed to being an advocate.”105  This Baby Judge “absolutely
loves what s/he does,” “is happy to get up every morning,” and was “born to do
this job.”106
Of the sixteen, there was only one Baby Judge who hedged somewhat on the
commitment to lifetime tenure.  That Baby Judge described sitting down with an
accountant to determine if s/he and the family could be comfortable on the salary
of a federal judge.  This Baby Judge had envisioned her/himself engaging in the
103Telephone Interview with Baby Judge G, January 4, 2016.
104Id.
105Telephone Interview with Baby Judge H, January 7, 2016.
106Id.
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private practice of law for the balance of her/his professional career.  Having
“crunched the numbers”107 with her/his accountant, s/he “believes” s/he can meet
the tenure obligations of the Article III appointment.108  However, in her/his mind,
s/he has reserved the option of resigning if financial considerations militate in that
direction.
Another Baby Judge had a singular approach.  Her/his commitment to
lifetime tenure extended only until the age of 65-70.  Upon assuming the Article III
judgeship, s/he gave herself/himself “permission to leave at 65-70” so that s/he
would still “be healthy enough to enjoy retirement.”109  This Baby Judge expressed
the view that s/he wanted to make a conscious decision about leaving the bench,
rather than have the decision made by default.  S/he voiced the intriguing thought
that an Article III judgeship “is such a great job that if you aren’t careful, the job
can overwhelm you and you can’t leave.”110
Two of the Baby Judges were relatively older than the other Baby Judges
and expressed an even stronger commitment to life tenure.  One expressed that s/he
107Telephone Interview with Baby Judge I, December 29, 2015.
108Id.
109Supra n.94.
110Id.
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“felt a personal obligation to stick it out.”111  The other made the point that s/he
“publicly told the Senate Judiciary Committee that [the Article III appointment]
was definitely not a stepping stone to something else.”112, 113
CONCLUSION:  The Baby Judges expressed “love” for their job as Article
III judges and all but two Baby Judges vowed unequivocal commitment (at least
initially) to life tenure.
B. Re-thinking Commitment to Life Tenure
Once the Baby Judges had generally confirmed their initial commitment to
remaining on the bench for the rest of their professional lives, I wanted to explore
what, if any, future considerations might cause them to re-think their commitment
to lifetime tenure.  Of the ten Baby Judges who had considered this question, five
gave the response of health concerns.  One Baby Judge put it in these terms:  “I
want to leave through the front door and not through the back door.”114  By that,
111Telephone Interview with Baby Judge J, January 5, 2016.
112Telephone Interview with Baby Judge K, January 5, 2016.
113This sentiment is in tune with Justice Rehnquist’s view of Article III
tenure.  See Clark, supra n.3 at n.377 (quoting Justice Rehnquist’s statement that
federal judgeships are supposed to be “lifetime careers rather than a stepping stone
to some other position”); id. (quoting Judge Mikva’s statement that an Article III
appointment “is supposed to be the last stop on the road”).
114Supra n.94.
38
s/he meant that s/he wanted to be healthy when s/he left the bench and not work
beyond her/his most productive years.  S/he recounted how s/he was affected by
watching judges come to court on walkers and when they were obviously ill.  S/he
didn’t want that to be her/him in twenty years.
Another Baby Judge has instituted a custom of informing his law clerks to
alert her/him if they perceive s/he is losing her/his ability to perform at a high
level.  S/he is of the view that “as long as you can do the job well, stay as long as
you can.”115  Because s/he has observed some colleagues in their 80s and even their
90s with physical and cognitive impairments, s/he is taking precautions against
staying on the bench past the time when s/he can do the job well.
Three other judges mentioned the health of family members, especially a
spouse.  As discussed previously, one Baby Judge would consider re-thinking his
commitment if unanticipated financial concerns arose.  And one Baby Judge mused
that “if the feeling of newness ever wears off” and s/he had “one more chance to do
something else,” s/he might rethink her/his commitment to life tenure.116  However,
s/he admitted that it is “hard to know” what s/he “would want to do” after being an
115Telephone Interview with Baby Judge L, November 19, 2015.
116Supra n.97.
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Article III judge.117
As an additional follow-up question, I queried the Baby Judges regarding
whether they could envision any frustrations of the job that might cause them to re-
think their commitment to Article III tenure.  This excellent follow-up question
was suggested by one of the first Baby Judges interviewed in response to my query
whether there were any other questions I should pursue.  This question focuses
more pointedly on job frustrations as opposed to external considerations that might
cause Baby Judges to re-think their commitment to Article III tenure.
The responses to this follow-up question varied from “There are no
frustrations that would cause me to rethink my commitment.  I love the job”118 to
“Congressional oversight that interferes with independence.”119  Although a
majority of the Baby Judges (ten of sixteen) espoused the former view, two judges
offered a different elaboration.  One Baby Judge voiced a potential frustration as
the limitations of what Article III judges can actually do.  S/he lamented that an
Article III judge can only decide the issues that are before that judge and cannot
change the legal system, or even the judicial system.  Over time, that limitation
117Id.
118Id.
119Telephone Interview with Baby Judge M, December 29, 2015.
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might result in a decision to leave the bench after attaining senior status to be
“more impactful.”120
The one judge who openly acknowledged the importance of financial
considerations at the outset, reiterated that although there were no frustrations “at
this stage”121 that would cause her/him to re-think her/his commitment to life
tenure if “financial circumstances changed,” s/he would reconsider.122  S/he also
referenced “job satisfaction, energy and interest” as “important factors” that would
influence any decision to reconsider her/his commitment to lifetime tenure.123
CONCLUSION:  Absent health concerns for themselves or
their spouses, the Baby Judges’ stated commitment to lifetime tenure generally
remains firm.
C. The Lure of Filthy Lucre124
Article III judges are extremely cognizant of the financial sacrifices that
come with life as a federal employee.  Personally, every October I mourn the
120Supra n.103.
121Supra n.107.
122Id.
123Id.
1241 Timothy 3:3.
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longevity check I received from my previous employer, which by now would have
been tens of thousands of dollars each year.  As a result, I thought it fruitful to
explore the topic of the lure of increased financial compensation with the Baby
Judges, who were appointed in the midst of the national conversation regarding the
underpayment of federal judges.
As it happens, the Baby Judges were fairly equally divided between those
coming from a public sector background and those coming from a private sector
background.  Generally, those coming from the public sector had opted early in
their professional careers to pursue public service rather than more lucrative
careers in the private sector.  Consequently, their transition into the pay of an
Article III judge did not include the financial sacrifice made by those who
transitioned from private practice into the public sector.  One Baby Judge
described taking a “huge paycut” to become an Article III judge.125  Another Baby
Judge described making the “decision to take a significant reduction”126 and that
s/he was prepared to live with that reduction “for the rest of [her/his] professional
125Telephone Interview with Baby Judge N, December 29, 2015.
126Supra n.103.
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life.”127  A third Baby Judge agreed, remarking that s/he “took a gigantic pay cut to
become a judge.”128  In the final analysis, the Baby Judges who entered into Article
III status from the private sector expressed contentment with the financial
sacrifices made.  One Baby Judge struck the balance in this manner:
In private practice, I was making a lot of money, with the
opportunity to make tons more.  But the work was not
that satisfying.  Here [as an Article III judge], there is
less money, but the work is infinitely more satisfying.129
From their responses, one surmises that the Baby Judges who were in private
practice conserved a considerable portion of their substantial earnings to fuel future
public service opportunities.  One Baby Judge reported that her/his years in private
practice “alleviated any financial considerations.”130  S/he “did well in private
practice and saved a bunch of money so [s/he is] financially free.”131  Another
related that s/he initially engaged in the private practice of law due to the press of
outstanding student loans.  S/he ended up staying for eighteen years, but always
had a public service career in mind.  A third Baby Judge described her/his
127Id.
128Telephone Interview with Baby Judge O, December 29, 2015.
129Supra n.125.
130Supra n.112.
131Id.
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seventeen-year tenure as a private practitioner enabling her/him to build a “nest
egg”132 bestowing “financial flexibility.”133  That flexibility in turn gave her/him
the comfort of not having to “try to parlay [the Article III judgeship] into
something more.”134
As a follow-up, I inquired whether there was any amount of money that
would tempt them to relinquish their Article III status.  Based on their responses,
the Baby Judges largely would not be tempted by any amount of money to
relinquish their Article III status.  As noted previously, those who were previously
in private practice had amassed sufficient wealth that financial considerations were
largely irrelevant in their career decisionmaking.  And those in the public sector
had long ago decided, if possible, financial considerations would not drive their
career choices.
One Baby Judge put it this way:  “If someone told me for a million dollars I
could be a partner at a firm, the answer would be no.”135
Another judge was not so sure.  S/he thought if a million-dollar offer were
132Supra n.102.
133Id.
134Id.
135Supra n. 100.
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on the table one would “have to at least consider it.”136  S/he mused that s/he
couldn’t really see her/himself going back into the courtroom as a lawyer because
“the practice of law is such a tough business now.”137  But if the offer included the
opportunity to function essentially as a super-mentor helping younger lawyers, that
might be an attractive proposition.
In the alternative, two Baby Judges would be tempted to relinquish their
Article III status if offered the position of Attorney General of the United States.  A
fourth Baby Judge remarked that “one day mediation could be tempting.”138  A
fifth Baby Judge disagreed, stating emphatically that “there was nothing else s/he
would rather be doing,” including arbitration.139  Indeed, after serving as an Article
III judge, this Baby Judge asserted that nothing else “appealed to her/him.”140
CONCLUSION:  The overwhelming majority of the Baby Judges (fifteen of
sixteen) articulated that no amount of money would tempt them to relinquish their
Article III status.  With one exception, the judges’ responses indicate that at this
136Supra n.111.
137Id.
138Supra n.128.
139Supra n.125.
140Id.
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point in their career, they have made peace with the financial concessions that
come with accepting a position in the public sector. 
D. The Lure of the Academy
By and large, Baby Judges are not particularly inclined to enter the academy
in lieu of continued service as an Article III judge.  One Baby Judge taught in a law
school for two years after graduating from law school, and was adamant about not
returning to that environment.  Although s/he “enjoyed interacting with the
students and the classroom time,” s/he did not enjoy writing law review articles.141
Six of the Baby Judges had previously served as adjunct professors.  One is
still serving as an adjunct professor and one has started teaching at a law school
since her/his appointment as an Article III judge.
One Baby Judge offered a particularly thoughtful observation regarding why
judges should be more active in the academy, and why the academy should seek
more involvement from judges.  S/he mentioned reading the recently published
Divergent Paths:  The Academy and the Judiciary by Judge Richard Posner.142 
Her/his takeaway from this publication is that there is far too little interaction
141Supra n.96.
142Richard A. Posner, Divergent Paths:  The Academy and the Judiciary
(Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2016).
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between federal judges and the academy.  From her/his perspective, the academy
should function less in the theoretical realm and embrace more practical
applications of the law in order to be of more pragmatic assistance to judges.  The
academy should also be more proactive in designing and providing training for
judges.  In turn, federal judges should do a better job of articulating to the academy
the needs of the federal judiciary, and how the academy can meet those needs.
This Baby Judge served as an adjunct professor prior to taking the bench. 
S/he was contemplating a return to the academy once s/he was acclimated to his
responsibilities on the court.  The thought of helping to shape the minds of
burgeoning lawyers was extremely appealing to this Baby Judge and most of the
others.
With the exception of two Baby Judges, who related that they had not given
“a great deal of thought” to becoming members of the academy, the other Baby
Judges reported an inclination to look favorably upon the idea of becoming
members of the academy, so long as they were not required to relinquish their
Article III status to do so.143
One of the judges who had not consciously considered becoming a member
of the academy described her/himself as “not particularly suited” for the
143Supra nn.94, 105.
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academy.144  This Baby Judge described perceiving the academy as a more
theoretical endeavor.  In contrast s/he described her/himself as embodying “a more
practical bent.”145  Ironically, this Baby Judge may be just the type of professor
most needed in the academy–one who brings “a more practical bent” to the largely
theoretical orientation of many law schools.
Another Baby Judge who had taught “individual classes episodically” and
one semester at a law school was lukewarm about the prospect of re-entering the
academy.146  S/he has concluded that it is “unlikely” that s/he would pursue a
professorship.147  S/he did not see her/himself as “suited to be a professor,”
describing the position as “too quiet” for her/his taste.148  More attractive to this
Baby Judge would be an opportunity to “guide advocacy or help advance litigation
practice,” perhaps in the American Inns of Court or a similar organization.149
The responses of other Baby Judges revealed a much stronger inclination
144Supra n.94.
145Id.
146Supra n.97.
147Id.
148Id.
149Id.
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toward the academy, at least as adjunct faculty.  One Baby Judge stated: “I always
taught in law schools and thought about going full-time before getting the Article
III appointment.”150  Another Baby Judge “practiced and taught law school for
thirty years and still teach.”151  A third of the fourteen who responded favorably
noted that s/he visits one law school “regularly” and another “occasionally.”152 
S/he envisioned her/himself more as a “guest lecturer” than participating as a law
professor in a more formalized sense.153
One of the Baby Judges who came from private practice revealed that s/he
always had a “dream” to teach but could not “realize” that dream due to the press
of business as a practicing attorney.154  S/he is now teaching legal writing, “loves
the adjunct position” and is “fulfilling two dreams at once.”155  Another Baby
Judge who came to the bench from private practice taught for three years as an
150Supra n.111.
151Supra n. 112.
152Telephone Interview with Baby Judge P, December 5, 2015.
153Id.
154Supra n.102.
155Id.
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adjunct professor “and could see her/himself doing adjunct again.”156  A third Baby
Judge who was in private practice considered teaching and views it as “an
opportunity to serve.”157  A fourth Baby Judge from the private practice arena
reported that s/he had “no real desire to teach” while s/he was a private
practitioner.158  As a federal judge, s/he is somewhat more interested in teaching at
a law school.  However, s/he is concerned that the caseload and work requirements
of a federal judge will not leave sufficient time to prepare a curriculum and lesson
plans.  In other words, this judge desires to be an excellent judge and an equally
excellent professor. S/he would not want his/her duties as a judge to compromise
the quality of her/his work as a professor.  Neither would s/he want her/his
obligations as a professor to make her/him a less effective judge.
On balance, the Baby Judges relayed a positive view of the academy, and
most were extremely receptive to the idea of entering the academy as professors,
although none would be willing to relinquish her/his Article III status to do so.  As
one Baby Judge explained, teaching as an adjunct is preferable to teaching full-
time because full-time professors are more involved in academic research than in
156Supra n.125.
157Supra n.103.
158Supra n.107.
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teaching.  However, the Baby Judges were not nearly as sanguine in their attitude
toward assuming a leadership position in the academy.  
To a person, the Baby Judges eschewed any possibility of relinquishing their
Article III status to assume the position of dean at a law school.  One of the Baby
Judges, who previously served on a search committee for a deanship vacancy,
stated emphatically her/his lack of interest in being the dean of a law school. 
Her/his initial reaction:  “The politicking and fundraising are not at all
appealing.”159  The Baby Judge then provided a laundry list of negatives that
dissuade her/him from considering a deanship:
• Fundraising
• Worrying About Rankings
• Faculty Issues
• Resistance To Non-Academic As Leader
• Administrative Responsibilities That Take One Away From
The Law.
Another Baby Judge revealed that s/he had been approached to take a
position as dean of a law school before becoming a judge.  S/he declined the
opportunity because s/he had no interest in the position.  Being dean of a law
159Supra n.111.
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school was not attractive to this Baby Judge because s/he perceived the position as
one of almost full-time fundraising.  S/he lamented that “the days when the law
school dean was the distinguished head of a faculty are gone.”160 
Another Baby Judge agreed that the idea of functioning as a dean would not
be tempting to her/him.  S/he reported that “most deans say they miss contact with
students.”161
A third Baby Judge remarked that it had “never occurred to her/him” to
consider a deanship.162  S/he could imagine the job would entail “a lot of
satisfaction” but also “parts s/he wouldn’t like.”163  S/he envisioned that “faculty
conflicts would be unpleasant” and that s/he “would probably be a good fundraiser,
but wouldn’t like it.”164  In short, this Baby Judge “would not enjoy the
management aspects” of being a dean.165
A fourth Baby Judge explained her/his lack of “inclination” toward a
160Supra n.112.
161Supra n.115.
162Supra n.97.
163Id.
164Id.
165Id.
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deanship by pointing out the obvious:  there is more security in a life-tenured
Article III appointment than in a deanship.166
A fifth Baby Judge lumped together the positions of full-time professor and
dean, relating that s/he doesn’t “want to worry about publishing, tenure or
fundraising.”167
A sixth Baby Judge reported that s/he has friends who are deans and those
friends confided that they did not enjoy being deans as much as they thought they
would due to the administrative and fundraising components of the deanship,
which are “no fun.”168  Her/his friends missed the “classroom and teaching part” of
being associated with a law school.169  The Baby Judge agreed that the “classroom
and teaching part” is what the Baby Judge would like to do.170
A seventh judge echoed this sentiment.  S/he “would enjoy teaching but
[has] no interest in raising money or in political issues.”171
166Supra n.105.
167Supra n.102.
168Supra n.125.
169Id.
170Id.
171Supra n.95.
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CONCLUSION:  Baby Judges left no doubt from their responses that
although they have an interest in sharing their knowledge with students, they are
not willing to relinquish their Article III status to do so.  They unequivocally
renounced any interest in joining the ranks of law school deans.
In summary, at this early stage of their judicial careers, Baby Judges express
deep commitment to the concept of life tenure.  According to the Baby Judges,
they generally did not view themselves as tempted by money to relinquish their
Article III tenure.  As a group, they did not identify any pressing job frustration
that might cause them to reconsider their commitment to life tenure.  They spoke
favorably of becoming participants in the academy, although not to the point of
relinquishing their life tenure.  To a person, they stated no interest in a law school
deanship. 
VII. Cluster Two - Sustainers
I readily confess that this was the group of judges whose responses I was
most eager to compile, but not only because this is the group of judges to which I
belong.  I was eager to examine how, if at all, years of service on the bench
changes the outlook of federal judges.  I was curious whether the love for the job
expressed by the Baby Judges continued, or whether the judges became a little
more jaded over time.  I was also intrigued by whether the commitment to life
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tenure had waned, whether financial concerns were more pressing, and whether
there was a greater or lesser inclination toward entering the academy.
The one thing that was apparent when interviewing the Sustainers was that
they had given a great deal of thought to Article III tenure and the benefits and
burdens that accompany that status.  Although most of them agreed with the
sentiment expressed by the Baby Judges of their commitment at the time of
appointment to Article III life tenure, their continued commitment was not as firm. 
In fact, two Sustainers were extremely close to joining both the ranks of The
Departed and of the legal academy as deans of major law schools. 
A. Initial Commitment to Life Tenure
At the outset, the commitment to Article III tenure was stated in less
emphatic terms by a few of the Sustainers when compared to the Baby Judges.  For
purposes of comparison, I start with the most emphatic stated commitments to
lifetime tenure and end with the least emphatic stated commitment to lifetime
tenure.
For starters, only two of the Sustainers spontaneously expressed “love” for
the job, as opposed to nearly all of the Baby Judges.  The most effusive Sustainer
stated that being an Article III judge is “still intellectually challenging and
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fulfilling” and that s/he “simply love[s] the work.”172  Another described being an
Article III judge as “the best job in the world.”173  S/he added that “there is so much
good you can do for the public in general.”174  A third Sustainer stated that s/he
“likes judge work.”175
When addressing specifically the commitment to lifetime tenure at the time
of their appointment, seven of the Sustainers expounded on their initial
commitment to life tenure, six responded without explication, and three expressed
less than firm initial commitment.
Of the seven Sustainers who elaborated on their initial commitment to
lifetime tenure, the following remarks were made:
• I was thinking that I would end my career as an Article III judge.  I
looked  at it as a lifetime job.176
• I intended to remain Article III for the balance of my life.177
172Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge A, January 4, 2016.
173Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge B, January 5, 2016.
174Id.
175Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge C, January 5, 2016.
176Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge D, January 4, 2016.
177Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge E, January 19, 2016.
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• When I took the bench, I planned to stay Article III for the duration.178
• I made that commitment [to lifetime tenure] because I made a huge
financial sacrifice to take this job.  So with that sacrifice, I’m in for
the long haul.179
• When I came on the bench, I thought I would be on the bench for the
rest of my professional life.180
• I came to the bench with the expectation that I would be taken out in a
box.  I considered this appointment the ending achievement of my
career.181
• I anticipated being Article III for the rest of my career.182
As previously noted, six other Sustainers confirmed their initial commitment
to lifetime tenure without explication.
The final three Sustainers were a bit more equivocal.  The first Sustainer
responded:  “I don’t know if I gave any thought to doing anything other than being
an Article III judge.”183
178Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge F, January 4, 2016.
179Interview with Sustainer Judge G, November 19, 2015.
180Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge H, January 5, 2016.
181Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge I, January 4, 2016.
182Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge J, January 15, 2016.
183Supra n.173.
57
The second recalled thinking that life tenure “seemed attractive.”184  Having
been informed “that a big pay raise was on the horizon,” the second Sustainer
“figured this was it.”185
The third Sustainer described being “of two minds” regarding life tenure.186 
In her/his “heart of hearts” s/he “wanted to work as an Article III judge forever–the
take me out of the courthouse feeling.”187  However, a “tiny part of her/himself
envisioned doing something else in time.”188
CONCLUSION:  In contrast to Baby Judges, Sustainers on average were not
as effusive in their commitment to lifetime tenure.  
B. Re-Thinking Commitment to Life Tenure
Responses to this inquiry revealed a divide between the Baby Judges and
Sustainers.  Whereas only the response of one Baby Judge wavered on her/his
continued commitment to life tenure absent serious health or financial concerns,
the Sustainers’ responses were not as firm, with two Sustainers going so far as to
184Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge K, February 16, 2016.
185Id.
186Supra n.172.
187Id.
188Id.
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seek employment in the academy.  Although twelve out of sixteen Sustainers
expressed their continued commitment to life tenure, a few of those commitments
were somewhat equivocal.  One Sustainer stated that “as an African-American,
there are so few appointed that I don’t feel I have the luxury of saying I don’t want
to do it anymore.”189  Another Sustainer remarked that “if something terrific came
up, I might re-think my position [regarding continued commitment to Article III
status].”190  A third Sustainer responded that s/he “still mostly felt” an intention to
remain an Article III judge until the end of her/his professional career.191
Although not as prevalent a response as with the Baby Judges, two
Sustainers mentioned health concerns as a factor that would cause them to re-think
their commitment to life tenure.  One Sustainer mentioned that s/he “wants to keep
going as long as [s/he] can” until “someone tells [her/him] that [s/he’s] slipping.”192 
S/he added that “hopefully [s/he] has enough people lined up who will tell
[her/him].”193
189Supra n.182.
190Supra n.184.
191Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge L, February 11, 2016.
192Supra n.176.
193Id.
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Another Sustainer related that s/he would re-think her/his commitment to
life tenure “if [s/he] felt being there was not helping anyone.”194  This Sustainer
hastened to add that s/he would not want to “totally leave the court.”195  S/he “likes
the relationships [s/he] has built” and “wants to keep the funding for additional
chambers,” which might disappear if [s/he] left the court.196  The court has “been a
part of [his/her] life for so long that it would be hard to imagine not being a part of
the court.”197  Moreover, s/he “likes the idea of retaining the title and resources of
the court.”198
One other Sustainer candidly admitted that s/he “sometimes thinks about
leaving the bench.”199  Another Sustainer was even more blunt:  S/he is actively
considering leaving the bench.  This Sustainer recently began to re-think her/his
commitment to life tenure and decided that s/he “doesn’t want to leave the best of
194Supra n.178.
195Id.
196Id.
197Id.
198Id.
199Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge M, February 11, 2016.
60
[her/himself] on the bench.”200
The two Sustainers who sought law school deanships gave a similar primary
reason for re-thinking their commitment to lifetime tenure:  they both felt less
challenged by the work.  One of the two explained that when s/he first became a
judge, s/he averaged sixteen trials per year.  Presently, her/his docket has narrowed
to almost exclusively drug cases, specifically those involving methamphetamine. 
Because there is usually not much of a defense in these cases, the Sustainer
described them as “slow guilty pleas” with trials lasting only 2-3 days.201  This
Sustainer concluded that “the work simply is not as interesting as when I first
started.”202  In addition, the Sustainer noted that s/he did not have a single civil trial
in the last year.  The disappointing lack of pay over the years was also a motivating
factor for this Sustainer, not so much for her/himself, but for her/his child.  
The other Sustainer echoed the perception that the quality of the work had
diminished for her/him.  After seventeen-plus years, the cases had become
“somewhat routine.”203  This Sustainer expressed the view that s/he was seeing
200Supra n.180.
201Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge N, February 12, 2016.
202Id.
203Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge O, November 23, 2015.
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“fewer challenging cases and might welcome a change.”204
When discussing other job frustrations that might cause them to re-think
their commitment to life tenure, one Sustainer mentioned lack of collegiality and
two others referred to any regulations that might disadvantage judges, such as
courtroom sharing or fewer law clerks.  The responses of the Sustainers generally
reflected some restlessness, with two of the number actively seeking to leave the
ranks of Article III judges. 
CONCLUSION:  When compared to Baby Judges, Sustainers express a less
enthusiastic commitment to Article III life tenure.  Even absent specific on-the-job
frustrations, a considerable number of Sustainers stated willingness to consider
leaving the bench.  As discussed, two of the Sustainers had even taken substantial
steps toward leaving the bench for the academy.  The responses of the Sustainers
suggest that, over time, a certain amount of burnout creeps in to erode the psychic
income that appeared to buoy the Baby Judges, as reflected in their responses.  
C. The Lure of Filthy Lucre
The Sustainers were, on the whole, much more focused on the economic
divide between them and their counterparts in the private sector.  One Sustainer
remarked that s/he left a lucrative law practice to enter public service as a judge. 
204Id.
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S/he recalled that s/he was “still not making as much as [s/he] made twenty-nine
years ago.”205  S/he “went from a Mercedes to a Honda and [is] still driving a
Honda.”206
Another Sustainer related that s/he had actually delayed seeking a judgeship
for a significant period of time for finance reasons.  S/he saved money so the
“financial transition wouldn’t be so dramatic.”207  Having made that substantial
sacrifice, this Sustainer was “now not inclined to let [Article III status] go.”  S/he
couldn’t “imagine going back into private practice for any amount of money.”208 
S/he considered what s/he was “doing now so much more important and
consequential” than making money in private practice.209
Seven of the Sustainers minimized the influence of financial considerations
on their career decisions when asked what amount of money would tempt them to
relinquish their Article III status, although one also responded that it would require
“substantially more than $200,000” for [her/him] to relinquish [her/his] Article III
205Supra n.179.
206Id.
207Supra n.181.
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status.210
One Sustainer explained that s/he was “committed to public service from the
beginning.”211  S/he “knew what [s/he] was getting into from the time s/he left law
school.”212  This Sustainer remarked that if money had been her/his motivation,
s/he “would have gone a different route.”213  Another similarly emphasized that
s/he was “not motivated at all by money” and that “no amount of money could
tempt [her/him] to relinquish her/his Article III status.214  “Not even a million a
year.”215  S/he had been in private practice for twenty-five years and was
“financially comfortable.”216  Like some of the Baby Judges who were in private
practice, this Sustainer “had in the back of [her/his] mind that financial resources
might enable [her/him] to take an Article III judgeship someday.”217
210Supra n.173.
211Supra n.177.
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A third Sustainer “didn’t sign on for the pay.”218  Her/his “only ambition is
to do the job to the best of [her/his] ability” and “nothing could change her/his
mind at this point.”219 
A fourth Sustainer agreed that “money is no issue,”220 and a fifth reiterated
that s/he “didn’t get into the profession for money.”221
A sixth Sustainer remarked that although money was not a concern for
her/him, s/he was aware that it was a concern for other of her/his colleagues.
A seventh Sustainer temporized that there are “no money pressures now,”
but related that s/he and his/her spouse “handled [college] tuition in some way or
other.”222
Two of the Sustainers were noncommital on the topic of financial
considerations, including one of the Sustainers who sought a deanship.  However,
the other Sustainer who sought a deanship candidly acknowledged that the lack of
adequate remuneration was a motivating factor in her/his decision to seek
218Supra n.176.
219Id.
220Telephone Interview with Sustainer Judge P, February 11, 2016.
221Supra n.178.
222Supra n. 184.
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opportunities outside the judiciary.  S/he took a pay cut to become a federal judge
and was “disappointed in the lack of pay increases over the years.”223 
Another Sustainer described teaching at a local law school although it was
“kind of a burden,” because s/he “needed the money.”224  S/he was reluctant to
leave the bench for a position in the private sector only because “if a judgeship is
perceived as a stepping stone to making money, [the private sector] could be seen
as a corrupting influence.”225  Nevertheless, s/he concedes that s/he is still “a little
tempted by money.”226
Two other Sustainers noted financial considerations as a “factor” that would
enter into their decisionmaking process.227
A fifth Sustainer discussed financial considerations in terms of “lifestyle.”228 
The implication of this terminology seems to be that a more restrained lifestyle
comes with Article III pay.  Although this Sustainer “didn’t see” her/himself
223Supra n.201.
224Supra n.199.
225Id.
226Id.
227Supra nn.173, 180.
228Supra n.182.
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tempted by money at this point, s/he also mused that “I’m sure there’s some
amount out there.”229
When asked what career opportunity would tempt them, the Sustainers gave
varying responses.  As discussed earlier, two of the Sustainers were obviously
tempted by law school deanships.230  Two others found mediation an attractive
career option, although a different two expressly disavowed any interest in
mediation.  One of the latter explained that if s/he “wanted to keep judging, [s/he]
would do it as an Article III judges rather than in the private sector.”231  S/he gave
as examples of possible options running for office or engage in the private practice
of law, although s/he “wasn’t thinking of doing either.”232
The other of the latter two has been approached by a mediation service but
was “not really tempted.”233  S/he also has been solicited to run for high public
offices because “some see judging as a stepping stone to politics.”234  If this
229Id.
230Interest in the academy is discussed more specifically in the next section.
231Supra n.220.
232Id.
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Sustainer became a mediator, s/he would mediate cases for no fee, “to help
people.”235
A different Sustainer would be tempted “if something terrific came up” such
as “President of Harvard or CEO of a multibillion corporation.”236  Another “may
think about something else after [her/his] term as Chief Judge.”237
The balance of the Sustainers could not conceive of another career that
would tempt them to relinquish their Article III status.
CONCLUSION:  Roughly one-third (five of sixteen) of the Sustainers
acknowledged that financial considerations might influence their decisions to
relinquish their Article III status in favor of a more lucrative position in the private
sector.  Although one or two of the Sustainers described compiling a nest egg
while in private practice to cushion the pay decrease, a majority of the Sustainers
(nine of sixteen) expressed willingness to “make do” on the salary of an Article III
judge, for now.  Two Sustainers were tempted by deanship opportunities and two
others consider mediation attractive.  Another two are willing to consider different
career choices. 
235Id.
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D. The Lure of the Academy
I will start this section with the two Sustainers with an obvious interest in the
Academy, the two who sought deanships.  Both had taught in law schools for
twenty-five plus years.  However, their decisions to seek deanships did not follow
parallel courses.  One Sustainer started contemplating leaving the bench two to
three years before becoming eligible for senior status, after someone on the law
school faculty sought her/him out for a deanship position.  Although that position
did not ultimately culminate in her/his assuming a deanship, the Sustainer is still
interested in a position in the academy.  S/he is now seeking a visiting professor
position for a semester “to see if something clicks.”238
When I asked whether it was difficult for her/him to decide to consider
relinquishing her/his Article III status, the Sustainer responded that s/he “would
miss the contemplative nature of the job,” the “conferring with law clerks” and
“deciding tough issues.”239  S/he also counted it as a plus that an Article III judge
“can take the time needed to resolve cases and has the luxury to do what is
238Supra n.201.
239Id.
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right.”240  Although the Article III position is a “great job,” the Sustainer saw “no
need to keep doing it.”241  S/he “would like to try something different” and feels
that s/he “has another career in [her/him].”242
The other Sustainer who sought a deanship wanted a position at a particular
school, so s/he saw the opportunity as a unique one, and was not looking for the
opportunity generally to enter the academy.  S/he remarked that it “would have
been a pang to leave the bench,” and now that the “unique situation” s/he pursued
did not materialize, s/he “will be an Article III judge for the balance of [her/his]
professional life.”243
The views of the other Sustainers, most of whom have taught, varied.  They
bear discussion individually.
Sustainer No. 1 has previously taught at a law school and sits on a law
school board.  S/he thinks that “law professors and deans have the best jobs in our
240Id.
241Id.
242Id.
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profession.”244  To her/him “these jobs are the best-kept secret in the legal field.”245 
S/he noted short work days, sabbaticals, opportunities to teach at other schools and
assistants as perks of the academy.  S/he added that “colleagues who have entered
the academy seem to enjoy it.”246  S/he seriously considered relinquishing her/his
Article III status to enter the academy full-time, but changed her/his mind mostly
due to the downturn in law school applications.  S/he “would not say no” to a
deanship and a professorship “would be tempting as well” if offered.247
Sustainer No. 2 taught law school for one year after graduating.  S/he “had
one feeler for a deanship”248 but was not interested in “fighting with faculty and
raising money.”249  A professorship “might be worth it if the right offer” came
along because “professors make more than judges” and writing law review articles
“appeals to [her/him].”250
Sustainer No. 3 taught law school before becoming a judge and is now an
244Supra n.173.
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adjunct professor.  S/he has taught for over thirty-five years.  This Sustainer has
“never seriously considered leaving the bench to teach.”251  S/he was approached to
apply for a deanship position, but “was adamant about ‘no.’”252  S/he has “no
attitude or aptitude for a top tier administrative management position.”253  S/he has
known several deans and has served on two search committees and described the
position of dean as “Head of the Complaint Department.”254  Moreover, s/he would
“hate asking for money.”255  Short answer:  No thanks.
Sustainer No. 4 taught for one year before becoming a judge, and as an
adjunct professor while sitting as a judge.  S/he is not interested in becoming a full-
time member of the academy.  To her/him, being a dean is “one of the hardest jobs
in the world,” requiring “a lot of energy [s/he] doesn’t] have.”256  S/he also noted
that s/he would “miss the community of judges, the high-level work environment
251Supra n.172.
252Id.
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and that “the respect of people in the community is nice.”257
Sustainer No. 5 has taught as an adjunct professor for thirty years.  S/he does
not see the academy as a viable option because “the legal profession is shrinking
due to the diminishing number of students.”258  Consequently, “law schools can’t
afford to hire judges.”259  S/he sees the academy as an “option gone for now for
judges” that “may return in five or six years.”260
Sustainer No. 6 taught for ten years as an adjunct professor while practicing
law.  S/he has been approached to teach again since becoming a judge and “taught
for a couple of years,” but is “too busy with work” to continue.261  Although s/he
currently has no definite plans to return to teaching, s/he “will teach again at some
point.”262  This Sustainer made the point that her/his “principal” focus is her/his”
judge work.”263  S/he explained that s/he is “better suited to be a judge and happier
257Id.
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than [s/he] would be as a professor.”264
This Sustainer also stated that “law school administration was not really
attractive to [her/him]” because the “public service of [her/his] current job is more
satisfying.”265
Sustainer No. 7 has taught for thirty-four years, and in the process has “met
a lot of deans.”266  S/he taught both before and after becoming a judge.  S/he “loves
working with students but not full-time.”267  She doesn’t “see her/himself teaching
full-time in the near future because s/he feels that s/he is “making a difference as a
judge and enjoys working with [her/his] colleagues and attorneys.”268 
Sustainer No. 8 has done some law school teaching and could do so again,
but is “not interested in a deanship.”269  S/he does not perceive a deanship as
“compatible with her/his skill set.”270  S/he is close friends with a dean and from
her/his observation “half the dean’s time is spent on fundraising and the other half
264Id.
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on faculty parking.”271 
Sustainer No. 9 has not taught so far but “could see her/himself teaching as
an adjunct professor while keeping [her/his] status as a federal judge.”272  This
Sustainer is not at all interested in becoming a dean.
Sustainer No. 10 “would like to teach at a law school if geographically
possible.”273  Unfortunately, this Sustainer’s residence is not located near a law
school.  In addition, this Sustainer “wouldn’t leave the bench to be a law professor
full-time.”274  Although this Sustainer expressed “a desire to associate with kids
and give them the benefit of what s/he knows,” s/he is not interested in being a
dean.275
Sustainer No. 11 finds teaching “somewhat attractive,” but noted that
teaching “might tie [her/him] down more than [s/he] desires.”276  At this point, the
Sustainer is “reluctant to commit to anything that “would interfere with time with
271Id.
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[her/his] family.”277  A deanship is not appealing, even though this Sustainer has
undertaken leadership positions in both his/her professional and personal lives. 
S/he “knows how to do it well, but administration of a law school, including
raising money, is not real attractive.”278  This Sustainer “wouldn’t necessarily turn
down an offer, but wouldn’t go looking for the opportunity.”279
Sustainer No. 12 “would not want to teach at a law school” and be
“committed to weekly classes and grading papers.”280  S/he might consider
teaching trial advocacy.
Sustainer No. 13 reflected that one would “have to think about if [the
Academy] is something you want to do, especially fundraising.”  S/he added that
“it’s not always an easy switch.”281  
Sustainer No. 14 expressed no interest in the Academy.
CONCLUSION:  Most of the Sustainers reported some experience teaching
in the academy, with several having taught in excess of twenty-five years. 
277Id.
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Although two of their number expressed willingness to relinquish their Article III
status for a position in the academy and two more reported an inclination to
consider making that choice, the other Sustainers responded that they were inclined
to retain their Article III status and serve in the academy as adjunct professors.
In summary, at this more advanced stage of their judicial careers, Sustainers
expressed a little more restlessness.  Two of them reported coming very close to
leaving the ranks of the judiciary and several others vocalized discontent with the
continued lack of a pay raise for Article III judges.  A number of the Sustainers
envisioned themselves pursuing other careers, including in the academy and as
mediators.
VIII. Cluster Three - The Departed
I anticipated that the responses of this group of judges would provide the
most useful information regarding future retention of Article III judges.  I
especially wanted to explore the actual reasons for their departures, including the
degree to which financial considerations played a role, and which careers lured
them away from the bench.
A. Initial Commitment to Life Tenure
As earlier discussed, my very first interviewee, one of The Departed,
recalled that “if anyone had asked [her/him] when [s/he] was first appointed, [s/he]
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would have responded that [s/he] would die on the bench.”282  With two
exceptions, other members of The Departed expressed the same sentiment.
One member of this cluster echoed an approach taken by a Baby Judge: 
S/he gave her/himself permission to retire at age seventy “all along.”283  Another
member recalled that s/he “didn’t think hard about lifetime tenure, but probably
assumed [s/he] would stay for the rest of [her/his] professional career.”284
The remaining members of the cluster agreed with the original interviewee. 
One of The Departed put it this way:  “I intended to be Article III for the balance of
my career when I took a 50 percent pay cut to go on the bench.”285
Another confirmed that when s/he “went on the bench, [s/he] absolutely
intended to stay “for the balance of his/her professional career.”286  S/he described
the federal judgeship as the “apex of the legal community,” providing an
“opportunity to decide incredibly important issues not only for litigants, but for the
282Supra n.93.
283Telephone Interview with Departed Judge B, January 12, 2016.
284Telephone Interview with Departed Judge C, January 5, 2016.
285Telephone Interview with Departed Judge D, January 12, 2016.
286Telephone Interview with Departed Judge E, January 21, 2016.
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legal system.”287  S/he saw the federal judgeship as a “great opportunity to immerse
[her/himself] in the law.”288  S/he described her/himself as “still a judge at [her/his]
core.”289  Yet another of The Departed responded that s/he “thought [s/he] would
die with her/his robes on.”290  Still another related that “when [s/he] took Article III
status, it never crossed [her/his] mind that [s/he] would leave.”291  S/he elaborated
that s/he “had no intention to do anything other than take senior status and then
work in that capacity for the rest of [her/his] career.”292
A different member of this cluster agreed that s/he “intended to be carried
out.”293 
One of The Departed described her/his intent to become a senior judge.  S/he
conveyed that when s/he was a Baby Judge, “being a senior judge was like being a
287Id.
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god.”294  There was a judge’s lunchroom where the junior judges went every day to
sit at the feet of the senior judges “and listen to their words of wisdom.”295
The balance of The Departed confirmed their initial commitment to lifetime
tenure without further elaboration.
CONCLUSION:  As with the Baby Judges and Sustainers, The Departed
confirmed their intent when appointed to remain on the bench for life.  
B. Continued Commitment to Lifetime Tenure
The approach to this inquiry differed for an obvious reason:  The Departed
have elected to relinquish their Article III status.  Consequently, with this cluster I
explored at what point in her/his career the decision was made to leave the bench,
and whether s/he feels a loss of prestige post-federal judgeship.
One of the most eye-opening interviews challenged my presumption that this
cluster of judges elected to relinquish their Article III tenure.  Rather, one of The
Departed insisted that s/he “did not give up [her/his] Article III status, but retired to
the annuity.”296  S/he lamented that “because of the way the Judicial Act is crafted,
294Telephone Interview with Departed Judge I, January 19, 2016.
295Id.
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Article III judges who retire are not subject to recall.”297  S/he urged that “if
Congress would amend the Judicial Act to allow Article III judges to be recalled
like magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges, the tide of departing judges would
be stemmed.”298  S/he explained that “a simple amendment to Title 28, Chapter 17,
to implement the same scheme as provided for magistrate judges and bankruptcy
judges would facilitate retention of lifetime tenure.”299, 300  This member of The
Departed went so far as to write members of Congress urging consideration of
legislation to that effect.301
This member of The Departed retired shortly after s/he qualified for senior
status.  She readily acknowledged that her/his retirement “was totally driven by
finances.”302  S/he expounded that “reality reared its ugly head.”  S/he had “three
kids in college at once and two in line for graduate school–one in law and one in
297Id.
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300See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(h) (allowing for the recall to service of retired
magistrate judges).
301A copy of one letter sent to Senator Grassley is attached as Appendix 1. 
According to this member of The Departed, Senator Grassley never responded.
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medicine.”303  This member of The Departed has “regretted it every day from the
day s/he retired.”304  S/he became a mediator with a private mediation service, and
compared the experience unfavorably with her/his judgeship, stating that being a
mediator “is not the same” as serving as an Article III judge, which s/he described
as the “best job in the world.”305
A second member of The Departed who is now a mediator also left no doubt
regarding the reason s/he elected to retire when eligible.  S/he observed that “no
real serious thought has been given by Congress to the money needs of judges.”306 
S/he also bemoaned the lack of a “solution to the [pay] linkage problem with
Congress.”307  This member of The Departed attributed much of “the problem” to
the Ethics Reform Act.  In her/his words:
The Ethics Reform Act changed everything.  Beforehand
[an Article III judge] could make sufficient money as an
adjunct or through honoraria.  [In the Ethics Reform
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Act], adjunct salary got sliced to practically nothing.308
From the perspective of this member of The Departed, “the exit trend” of
Article III judges has been “largely prompted by the Ethics Reform Act and its
limitations.”309  S/he added that the “so-called pay raise was not nearly enough to
offset the decreased compensation from teaching and honoraria.”310
This member of The Departed also expressed frustration with the expansion
of federal crimes.  S/he explained that federal courts have “turned into criminal
courts with no trial of civil cases.”311  S/he noted that “civil cases are increasingly
going to private mediation.”312  Ultimately, this member of The Departed described
her/himself as motivated “50% financially and 50% by frustration with the
federalization of crimes.”313  This member of The Departed concluded that “the
morale of the judiciary tanked due to the salary situation and the fact that we
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turned into a criminal court.”314  
This member of The Departed stated that the “psychic income prestige factor
was hard to give up but his/her children and grandchildren are more important.”315
A third member of The Departed who is a private mediator related that s/he
retired for two main reasons:  1) “the failure of Congress to confer a [cost-of-living
adjustment year after year]”316 and 2) the growth of the mediation industry.  This
member of The Departed recalled that in twenty-two years, her/his salary increased
only $40,000.00.  S/he also noted that when s/he was in private practice, lawyers
settled their own cases; there was “no such thing as a mediation firm.”317
This member of The Departed explained that when s/he was appointed to the
bench, the appointment came with a financial sacrifice because s/he left private
practice before “the real explosion of legal salaries commenced.”318  Consequently,
s/he was not “able to accumulate a nest egg while practicing,” as described by
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several of the Baby Judges and Sustainers.319
S/he recalled being recruited by a private mediation service where “many
former judges were making a substantial income.”320  /he described the decision as
“enormous,” and after becoming eligible for senior status “took a year or two of
thinking about and wrestling with” the offer “before finalizing [his/her] decision”
to leave the bench.321
This member of The Departed “can’t believe [s/he’s] gone from the federal
bench” and “regret[s] leaving in many ways.”322  S/he expressed that serving as a
private mediator is “not an especially good tradeoff, but [s/he] enjoys the extra
income.”323  S/he revealed that the mediation field is “competitive,” requiring
“market[ing] and glad hand[ing],” which s/he described as “somewhat
demeaning.”324  However, her/his spouse had formerly been the primary financial
support for the family.  Once her/his spouse retired s/he felt an obligation “to
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shoulder more of the financial responsibility for the family.”325  Consequently, s/he
would make the same decision “as much as [s/he] regrets not being on the
court.”326  S/he “attend[s] ceremonial court functions and maintain[s] a relationship
with some of the judges with whom [s/he] is especially close.”327  Nevertheless, for
this member of The Departed it is “still a strange feeling going into the courthouse
and not being an Article III judge.”328
This member concluded with a “piece of advice to someone considering
leaving the bench:  Be absolutely sure it’s what you want to do.  You can’t go
back.”329
A fourth member of The Departed who is now a private mediator narrated a
more circuitous route to retirement.  This member of The Departed related that “in
the last few years” of his/her active service, s/he was part of the Wellness
Committee.  In that capacity, s/he observed firsthand “the dilemma of judges who
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stayed too long.”330  This member of The Departed “didn’t want to risk that
[staying too long].”331  Rather s/he “wanted to leave while [s/he] was still at the top
of [her/his] game.”332  
According to this member of The Departed, her/his “legacy and reputation in
the legal community are important to [her/him].”333  Although “not the driving
factor,” this member of The Departed also discussed the “financial consideration”
of “helping prepare for [her/his] granddaughter’s college expenses.”334 
When asked about any regrets, this member of The Departed admits that s/he
“misses being the funniest person in the room.”335, 336
The fifth member of The Departed who serves as a private mediator has also
founded a think tank, teaches at a law school and is Of Counsel with a law firm. 
S/he revealed that ten to twelve years into her/his tenure, s/he “started to re-
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336Janet S. Kole, Don’t Be Funny:  Litigation is no laughing matter to your
clients, ABA Journal, November 2015, at 26 (“We eventually realized that anytime
a judge tells a joke, everyone has to laugh.”).
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think”337 lifetime tenure.  S/he found it a “financial burden to send three boys to
college.”338  S/he considered her/himself to be “just paying bills.”339
In addition, prior to her/his appointment, s/he had served as an elected
official.  In that capacity, s/he “enjoyed interaction with people [and] missed that
life.”340  S/he also desired to start a think tank and felt that “so many things were
pulling [her/him] toward a life outside the bench.”341
Although this member of The Departed misses being an Article III judge,
s/he does not regret her/his decision.  This member of The Departed expressed that
an Article III judge “never loses the prestige.”342  S/he explained that s/he will
“always have the prestige of being an Article III judge.  Everyone knows [s/he]
was an Article III judge and [s/he] still gets the utmost respect.”343
The next four members of The Departed represent a phenomenon unique to
federal judges in California–movement from the federal district court bench to the
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state appellate bench.  As one of the California judges remarked and as observed
with judges from other states who were interviewed, the more usual occurrence is
movement from the state bench to the federal bench.  As another of the California
judges put it, the trend to “go from Article III to the state [appellate] court is
unique to California.”344
The first of the California judges began to contemplate leaving the federal
district court for the California Supreme Court after four to five years on the bench. 
S/he wanted a “chance to be an appellate judge.”345  S/he noted that a previous
Chief Judge of the California Supreme Court had followed the same path from
federal district court to the California Supreme Court.  This first California judge
articulated that the “single most important factor” influencing her/his decision was
“the opportunity to work as an appellate judge for the most prestigious state court
in the country” and “make law on important issues in the highest state court.”346  It
was also important that s/he already had twelve years in the state court system and
could retire four years earlier in the state court than in the federal court.
At the time this first California judge made her/his decision, s/he assessed
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her/his “chance to get on the Ninth Circuit as slim.”347  Although “not dispositive,”
s/he also considered that the insurance benefits and pay were better in the state
system and that a car was provided.348  As for regrets, the first California judge
“never looked back.”349
The second California judge decided to relinquish her/his Article III status
after eleven years, even though s/he considered the federal judgeship “the most
interesting work [s/he] ever had” and “the work in state court not necessarily as
interesting.”350  However, due to the “scope and complexity” and volume of work,
even though this California judge “liked the work,” s/he “didn’t carve out personal
time, ground her/himself down and incurred health problems.”351  This California
judge is of the view that the judgeship on the state court is a “better fit for [her/his]
personality” because “the rhythm of the [state] cases allows you to be more
deliberate.”352
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In retrospect, this California judge has come to realize that s/he could now
“do a better job as an Article III judge” including “carv[ing] out personal time.”353 
S/he now understands that “the work doesn’t all have to be done in a day.”354  S/he
“could have worked differently and kept the best job [s/he] ever had.”355
Although this California judge does not regret her/his decision, s/he
perceives a “difference in status.”356  In her/his perception, “the federal judiciary is
the crown jewel and is held in higher esteem.”357  According to this California
judge, the “important issues of the day are mostly decided in federal court” and
s/he misses that.358
This California judge also remarked that s/he would not have returned to the
state court bench if the “finances hadn’t worked out.”359  With the higher salary in
the state court and eligibility for a state court pension due to her/his earlier state
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service, returning to state court “made financial sense.”360  Overall, this California
Judge expressed satisfaction with the choice s/he made.
The third California judge began to consider “new challenges and
opportunities” after completing her/his stint as Chief Judge and becoming eligible
for senior status.361  By 2012, the status of senior judges had changed, resulting in
the lack of a “critical mass of senior judges.”362  Rather than taking senior status,
active judges were leaving the federal bench due to space-sharing requirements and
staff reduction.  This California judge did not foresee elevation to the Ninth Circuit
due to the relative youth of Obama appointees.
On the other hand, the governor of California appeared more receptive to
appointing judges in their sixties.  This California judge reported that of the people
s/he consulted before finalizing her decision, “half thought it was great and the
other half thought s/he was crazy.”363
For this California judge, money was not a consideration, and s/he “felt no
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loss of judicial prestige.”364  S/he acknowledged that a “lot of people feel a federal
judgeship is more prestigious.”365  S/he countered that “on the other hand, [s/he]
went from a trial judge to an appellate judge.”366  In addition, this California judge
is on the same court as another former federal judge, which “helps to alleviate any
feeling of loss of prestige.”367  This California judge expressed no regrets.
The fourth California judge began to re-think her/his commitment to life
tenure after six years, and left two years later.  S/he was working seventy hours a
week and “felt beleaguered,” but “figured that was [her/his] life.”368
This California judge realized that a change was needed when s/he found
her/himself trying to find time to attend the memorial service for her/his mother. 
S/he asked her/himself, “what does that say about the quality of my life?”369  S/he
realized that this was “not a healthy way to live life.”370
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This California judge has “no regrets.”371  As a state appellate judge s/he
sees “all law all the time.”372  The work is “as intellectually challenging but without
the grind.”373  There has “not been a day in [her/his] life where [s/he] wanted to be
back in federal court.”374 
Money was “really not a factor” for this California judge.375  As for prestige,
this judge responded:  “Prestige is not a factor to my friends and I don’t care what
those who don’t know me think.”376
The next three of The Departed left the bench for the academy, two as deans
and one as a returning professor.
One of the two deans initially observed that there are not really that many
former federal judges in the academy.  Her/his experience was that former judges
are “mostly” with private mediation services.377  This dean surmised that s/he was
sought after as a dean due to her executive-level administrative experience in
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higher education prior to becoming a judge.  As s/he approached the end of her/his
term as Chief Judge, s/he was feeling less challenged by the work.  At the same
time, s/he was feeling “constrained at times about what [s/he] could say or be
involved in.”378  S/he “didn’t want to be a bystander to good works.”379 
Nevertheless, s/he “had a terrible time deciding” to leave the bench.380  For
her/him, the decision was “wrenching.”381  
In the final analysis, this dean accepted an offer from a law school that
particularly intrigued her/him.  S/he made it clear that s/he “wouldn’t go just
anywhere.”382  Rather, s/he selected an institution where s/he could provide
“payback for the privilege of having been a judge.”383  But, “financial
considerations were also important.”384  This dean has children and expressed the
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need to put her/his “family well-being in a high-priority position.”385  S/he
remarked that “many other judges came on the bench from lucrative law practices”
and s/he “didn’t want to leave [her/his] children with their student debt.”386
When asked if s/he had any regrets, this dean reflected that “sometimes
[s/he] think[s] it was a really good existence as a judge.”387  S/he considers that
s/he “lost prestige but that was not very important to [her/him]” and s/he “still
ha[s] a lot of the gravitas.”388  On balance, s/he thinks s/he would make the same
decision.
The second dean changed her/his mind about remaining on the bench when
s/he was approached regarding opening an affordable law school.  S/he though this
concept “had real possibilities.”389  S/he was “not attracted to just starting another
law school.”390  S/he “sees the academy as a natural progression for federal
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judges.”391  S/he personally “was not interested in going to a big law firm for big
bucks.”392  S/he “didn’t want to go back and be somebody partisan.”393  In her/his
opinion, s/he “owed the office more than that” and “didn’t want to cash in on the
office.”394
This dean is “glad [s/he] did it” and has no regrets.395  S/he “would make the
same decision all over again.”396  S/he considered it the “greatest opportunity in the
world to be an Article III judge.”397  S/he “did the best [s/he] could while there”
and doesn’t “look back.”398
This dean feels “no sacrifice of prestige.”399  S/he acknowledged that “with
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the appointment to the federal bench you gain instant prestige and credibility.”400 
However, s/he was “more excited to see if [s/he] could make the system work the
way [s/he] envisioned.”401  As with another of The Departed, this dean lamented
that “no one laughs at [her/his] jokes and [s/he] is treated differently, but that’s
ok.”402, 403
Finally this dean related that “money was not really an issue” in her/his
decision.404
The third member of The Departed returned to the academy after five and
one-half years on the federal bench.  Crime victims’ rights was her/his interest
even before s/he became a judge.  The singular event that galvanized her/him was
participation in an engaging seminar.  S/he found her/himself thinking, “this is
where I should be.”405  S/he was aware that the cases s/he decided were important. 
However, s/he came to believe that s/he “had unique skills to help crime victims”
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and that “others could do the judicial work.”406  In addition to serving as a law-
school professor, s/he “now does pro bono crime victims’ work around the
country.”407
The professor gave three reasons for leaving the bench:
1. The opportunity to return to teaching;
2. The opportunity to do pro bono advocacy for crime victims; and
3. The lack of a pay raise for judges.
The professor expressed that it was difficult to tell people who had
supported her/him for a federal judgeship that s/he was relinquishing her/his
position.  Indeed, some family members and colleagues “tried to talk [her/him] out
of giving up [her/his] Article III commission.”408
As for regrets, the professor “occasionally miss[es] staff, clerks, litigation
and colleagues but feels [s/he] is in the right place for [her/him].”409  Although s/he
would make the same decision again, s/he “feel[s] badly that [s/he] only stayed for
5 ½ years” and is “sorry about all the effort to get [her/him] through had to be
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repeated” with her/his successor.410
The professor reflected that there was a loss of prestige, but the tradeoff was
more control of her/his personal life.  All in all, the loss of prestige was “not a big
factor.”411
The remaining four of The Departed left the bench for various other
positions.  The first of the remaining four left to become chief executive officer of
a pro bono law firm.  S/he simply explained that “reinventing yourself every now
and then is a good thing to do.”412
The second was recruited to seek an executive-level government office,
which s/he twice refused.  Finally, her/his spouse convinced her/him that if s/he
didn’t take this opportunity, s/he would “always wonder if [s/he] could have made
a difference.”413
This member of The Departed emphasized that s/he was not at all
“dissatisfied with being a judge.”414  S/he clarified that s/he misses being a judge
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“greatly.”415  What s/he misses “the most” is the “opportunity to really sit down
and think about the law and immerse oneself in legal arguments.”416  S/he
described the decision to leave the bench as “agonizing” and “very personal”
because s/he “loved going to the courthouse, hearing arguments and deciding
cases.”417  Nevertheless, while sitting on the bench and deciding cases, s/he was
also acutely aware of important “issues in society, particularly the economic
turmoil” and thought s/he “could make a difference.”418
This member of The Departed described talking to a number of people
before announcing her/his decision, including her/his colleagues on the bench. 
Her/his primary aim was to ensure that her/his departure was not construed in any
way “as a negative reflection on the bench.”419  S/he expressed “so much respect
for judges and the justice system” that s/he “didn’t want anyone to think” s/he “was
using the bench as a stepping stone because [s/he] wasn/t.”420  S/he does not regret
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making the decision because s/he “feels [s/he] made a difference” and would
“probably” make the same decision again.421
When asked about the loss of prestige, this member of The Departed
responded that s/he “feels [s/he] let people down” and “part of [her/him] feels like
[s/he] stepped away from a lifetime commitment.”422  S/he “didn’t want to
disappoint people and felt like [s/he] did.”423
The third of this group of four returned to private practice.  S/he explained
that s/he began considering leaving the bench nine years before s/he actually left,
shortly after becoming eligible.  S/he expounded that s/he “chafed under Supreme
Court precedent,”424 especially that pertaining to the sentencing guidelines.  In
addition, in her/his view, the Supreme Court started “becoming the flood itself
rather than protection against the flood.”425
This member of The Departed described her/himself as an “activist by
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orientation, having previously practiced as a civil rights lawyer.”426  S/he “felt the
need to speak out about certain issues and do something about them.”427  It was
important to her/him to actively “participate in problems minorities face rather than
sitting as a judge waiting for a particular case to come to you.”428  This member
added that “money was also a part of it,” noting that law clerks were making more
money after two to three years than the judges for whom they clerked.429 
S/he expressed no regrets and concluded that “all in all” s/he had suffered no
loss of esteem in the community.430
The final member of The Departed retired to simply enjoy life.  S/he stated
that s/he no longer “uses [her/his] judge title,” doesn’t “miss the work” and doesn’t
“miss going to the courthouse everyday.”431
CONCLUSION:  Five of The Departed left to join private
arbitration/mediation firms.  Four California judges relinquished their federal
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judgeships for positions on the state appellate courts.  Three of The Departed left
for the academy.  Of the remaining four, one became chief executive officer of a
pro bono law firm, one pursued a high-level government office, one returned to the
private practice of law, and one retired simply to enjoy life.
C. The Lure of Filthy Lucre
As discussed in the previous section, nine of the sixteen members of The
Departed attributed their departure, in whole or in part to financial considerations,
primarily the year-to-year lack of pay raises.
D. The Lure of the Academy
As discussed in a previous section, two of The Departed relinquished their
judgeships for deanships.  According to their responses, both accepted unique
opportunities and were not necessarily focused on careers in the academy prior to
being sought out.  A third member of The Departed returned to the academy after
five years as an Article III judge.
Of the remaining thirteen members, six expressed no interest in becoming
involved with the academy.
Of the five members of The Departed who are presently serving as private
mediators, four expressed an interest in the academy.  The first reported having
done some teaching at the local law school, but didn’t see a deanship as “feasible
104
due to the fact of geography:  only one law school here” and s/he was “not inclined
to relocate.”432
The second taught as an adjunct professor while a judge and has continued
to teach post-retirement.
The third taught the entire time s/he was a federal judge, from the 1980s. 
S/he related that “there is nothing more gratifying than interacting with young
people.”433  S/he added that one can’t complain about what the present generation
of attorneys is doing “if you had a hand in shaping them.”434  S/he also expressed
that law schools “need people from the real world to teach and train the next
generation of lawyers.”435  S/he was approached to serve as dean “a couple of
times.”436  S/he declined because s/he was “not interested” in “rubber chicken
dinners where money is solicited and you name bathrooms after [the donors].”437
The fourth “taught as an adjunct professor for years,” but did not perceive
432Supra n.93.
433Supra n. 306.
434Id.
435Id.
436Id.
437Id.
105
any “real opportunities” for her/him in the academy.438  S/he “wasn’t sure law
schools are clamoring for retired judges.”439
The California judges did not respond positively to the notion of entering the
academy.  Of the two who elaborated, one responded that s/he was “not at all
interested in law school.”440  S/he added that “legal scholarship didn’t appeal” to
her/him and that s/he “didn’t have a feel for it.”441  The other stated that s/he “likes
the didactic aspects of teaching,” but s/he was not sure “whether the publishing
aspects would be too esoteric.”442
The member of The Departed who left for an executive-level government
office expressed exuberance at the prospect of entering the academy.  S/he thinks
s/he “has a lot to offer.”443  S/he articulated interest in teaching and in being a dean. 
S/he enjoys visiting schools, and has visited between two and three hundred of
them, from elementary to post-graduate.  S/he sees her/himself as a good
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administrator.
CONCLUSION:  Among The Departed are five private
arbitrators/mediators, four federal judges who became state judges, three members
of the academy, one chief executive officer of a pro bono firm, an executive-level
government official, a private practitioner and a true retiree.  Of the sixteen
members of The Departed, nine cited financial considerations as a factor in her/his
departure.
In summary, the Departed expressed an initial commitment to life tenure, but
described increasing frustration, primarily with the lack of adequate compensation. 
Although three landed in the academy, the largest number of this cluster (five)
elected to become private arbitrators/mediators.
X. Implications
Using the words of members from the three clusters, I endeavored to
conduct a somewhat longitudinal survey of Article III judges and some of the
factors that influence their decisions relating to lifetime tenure.  From these
responses, I garnered the following implications for life tenure that may warrant
further study and/or discussion:
1. To a person, the Article III judges interviewed agreed that it was a
unique honor and privilege to serve as an Article III judge.
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2. The overwhelming majority of judges interviewed expressed the
intent, when initially appointed, to remain an Article III judge for life (41 out of
48).
3. Baby Judges represent a possibly untapped pool of potential adjunct
professors, considering their expression of interest in becoming part-time
participants in the academy.
4. The less firm commitment to lifetime tenure expressed by the
Sustainers could benefit from a more focused examination to determine whether
there is a burnout factor that needs to be proactively addressed by the
Administrative Office of the Courts.
5. The increasing number of Sustainers who are influenced by financial
considerations as compared to Baby Judges (eight compared to one), and who are
willing to consider different career choices (seven compared to four) may portend
decreased retention rates of judges approaching senior status.
6. The significant number of references by the Sustainers (eight of
sixteen) and The Departed (nine of sixteen) to a lack of sufficient pay urges
immediate and continuous exploration of the adequacy of pay for Article III
judges. 
7. The ability of state appellate courts in California to lure away federal
108
judges with lifetime tenure warrants a comparison of the federal and state systems
to determine whether systemic changes are needed to federal appointment/retention
policies.
8. Based on the responses of The Departed, private mediation service
rather than the academy, is the most attractive career choice for those relinquishing
Article III status (five as opposed to three).  This potential drain of Article III
judges may warrant investigation by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
The interviews conducted in the course of preparing this thesis provided a
measure of insight into some of the factors that influence federal judges making
life tenure decisions.  It is hoped that the information presented spurs further study
of this important subject.
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Hon. Chuck Grassley
United States Senator
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee
135 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
Re: Recall of retired U.S. District Court Judges to ease case backlog.
Dear Senator:
As the Wall Street Journal reported today, civil suits are piling up in certain District
Courts for want of judges to try them.  The sense of the article was that additional judgeships be
created as a solution.  In response you reasoned that adding, at the cost of $1 million a year year
per judgeship for life terms, judges to cover backlogs “in busier courts without simultaneously
reducing the number in courts where there aren't needed is irresponsible.”  I agee and write to
offer what I think would somewhat if not substantially alleviate the problem.
I suggest you consider seeking legislation to authorize the voluntary recall, as needed, of
retired U.S. district court judges to sit temporarily to assist in reducing the backlog.  If such
legislation were passed it would correct something overlooked in Chapter 17 of Title 28, dealing
with the retirement of of U.S. district judges:  the benefits that would accrue to our justice system
by allowing their recall as needed on a case by case basis in the U.S. District Courts.  Since these
retired district judges already have lifetime appointments, all that should be needed for their
recall eligibility is statutory authorization.  This should materially limit the need for the creation
of additional judgeships.
As was I, many district judges were compelled to take retirement in order to earrn
additional money to see to the education of their children.  In my case, I had three in college and
graduate school at once.  Now many of us have pretty much completed that obligation and are
anxious to serve.  The United States has a great deal invested in our training and experience, and
each district chief judge should have the power and discretion to recall us as needed to serve and
deal with district court case load back logs.
Very truly yours,
Appendix I
